When deciding whether to accept into service a new safety-critical system, or choosing between alternative systems, uncertainty about the parameters that determine probabilities of future failures may be a major problem. This uncertainty can be extreme if unknown design errors may be present (e.g. in software), or if there can be wide variation between nominally equivalent components.
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Introduction
Predictions of reliability and safety through probabilistic modelling depend on the values of the parameters of the probabilistic models, e.g. component failure rates, but the values of these parameters are often uncertain. The application scenarios that motivate our work are mostly in the area of assessing whether a software product should be accepted in a safety critical application, specifically an application that requires high probability of the software product not causing any accident over the operational life a of a system in which it is embedded. For instance, in civil aviation there is an explicit requirement that "catastrophic failure conditions" must be "so unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all airplanes of one type" [14] . In nuclear power, protection systems may have required or claimed pfd bounds like 10 −7 [21] or 10 −9 [20] , again such as to assure very low probability of such a failure ever happening during the projected operation life of such systems. Large uncertainties about the reliability actually achieved in software make these decisions particularly difficult.
The same decision problems seen for software may also arise for physical components, and with respect not only to safety issues, but to reliability as well, e.g. when a component should last for the lifetime of the system of which it is part, because it cannot be replaced or repaired, either by design (as in many consumer products) or by necessity (e.g. hardware components in spacecraft).
Our reference example is a system S whose failure process is completely characterised by a constant probability of failure per demand (pfd ), for which high confidence is required that it will operate until the end of its service life without failures that would cause accidents. This requires predicting S's probability of surviving T future discrete, independent demands -its reliability in discrete time R(T ) -with T being an upper bound on the number of demands that will happen in the system's lifetime if accident-free. 1 This prediction would be straightforward except for uncertainty about the value of the pfd, which may arise from various factors, for instance because this value:
• is inferred from experience with components that are similar, but not identical, to the one for which a prediction is sought, and/or that operate in potentially different conditions, affecting their reliability differently;
• is guessed on the basis of indirect evidence, as e.g. is often done regarding probabilities of failure due to software design faults.
This uncertainty can in theory be rigorously described by a subjective probability distribution for the value of each parameter. However, an assessor has seldom a clear idea of this distribution, and many calculations are de facto performed by just assuming that the expected pfd is the true pfd of the system. Sensitivity analysis may be applied to check that small variations in the estimate only cause acceptable errors in the predictions, but in practice much reasoning among practitioners only deals with point estimates, without acknowledging that, in fact, the shape of the probability distribution of the parameter value may have a substantial effect on the predicted value sought (e.g. reliability over a given period of operation), and this effect may not be obvious.
Thus the practice of using point estimates in calculations may lead to errors of various kinds [1, 8] .
Uncertainty about parameter values is a typical case of epistemic uncertainty in predictions (i.e., uncertainty arising from lack of knowledge rather than from an "inherent randomness" of the process studied). Epistemic uncertainty is widely studied (e.g. [17, 18] ) and many formal mathematical methods have been proposed for dealing with it, but much normal practice does not use them. The practical approaches, e.g. in the nuclear industry (see e.g. [11, 13] ), are essentially of two kinds: qualitative criteria for accepting evidence (e.g., requiring that parameter value be derived from evidence that is more clearly pertinent to the specific plant, the more critical the parameters in question are) and numerical methods for performing either sensitivity analysis or calculations taking into account the complete probability distributions that describe uncertainty on the parameters. To cite [11] :
Because the impact of parameter uncertainty can be addressed in terms of a probability distribution on the numerical results of the PRA, it is straightforward to compare a point value, be it the mean, the 95th percentile, or some other representative value with an acceptance guideline or criterion . . . For most regulatory applications, that value is specified to be the mean value [. . . ] The mean values referred to are the arithmetic means of the probability distributions that result from the propagation of the uncertainties on the input parameters.
Uncertainty propagation methods will in theory produce accurate results for any given distribution; but their application is hard: apart from computational complexity, their fundamental drawbacks are in requiring a complete description of the distribution of the parameters, which in practice may not be easy to specify with any degree of soundly based consensus (especially if we consider that the uncertainties on the various parameters are not statistically independent -a concern called sometimes "epistemic correlation"), and in delivering numerical results rather than insight on how the various aspects of uncertainty on the parameters may affect the results.
It is also the case that in many application areas the issue of parameter uncertainty is not yet generally addressed [8] . Our starting point in this paper, therefore, is to look for simpler, albeit less general, methods for reasoning with epistemic uncertainty. We consider a simple and common scenario, and characterise the errors incurred when making assumptions on distributions of which only the mean (expected value) is given. We observe some results that are simple enough for routine application, and yet seem unexpected enough (from anecdotal evidence: our own experience of discussing them with researchers and practitioners) that their implications for common scenarios of decision making are worth discussing.
Our reference scenario is that of the system subject to discrete demands, and characterised by a single parameter, its pfd, highlighted above. We will discuss both scenarios of assessment of software (the original motivation of our work) and of hardware. The latter scenarios are practically interesting, because broad variation in reliability parameters is a concern with hardware too (renewed with the current alarm about supplies of electronic components being "contaminated" with unreliable "counterfeit" components), and useful for insight, because examples in which probability distributions represent frequencies in concrete populations often help intuition about general results in probability.
In the rest of this paper, section 2 discusses causes of parameter uncertainty and some prediction errors it may cause. Next, we introduce a set of mathematical results: section 3 states an upper and a lower bound on the reliability after t demands, if only the expected system pfd is known; section 4 presents some extensions and consequences of these results, including the case of reliability in continuous time; section 5 shows that the bounds of section 3 are a special case of a more general effect whereby, given the expected system pfd, a "broader" distribution of this parameter (in a specific meaning of "broader") implies higher reliability; section 6 discusses the difficulty of extending these theorems to multiple-parameter reliability functions. We then proceed in section 7 to discuss various implications of this set of results on practical decision making, including simplifications of certain decision problems, but also some difficulties, including a need to specify in more detail the criteria one wishes to apply for accepting systems into operation, or for ranking alternative systems. Section 8 contains a summary of conclusions.
2 Uncertainty on parameters and its effects
The inevitable uncertainty on the pfd
To estimate system S's pfd, one often relies on experience with similar systems: statistics that have been collected, or informal "expert judgement". These approaches can be seen as selecting a "reference" population of systems that are similar to system S, and then using their estimated pfd s (usually their mean) to estimate the pfd for system S. It is known that these systems are not identical, and they only define a statistical distribution of pfd values: system S's pfd may be anywhere in the range observed; or even outside it, although perhaps with low probability. The degree to which this process gives confidence varies. For software, arguments that the probability of failure is low thanks to a high quality development process -where "high quality" is a judgement based on experience -in practice use as "reference set" previous software products produced by ostensibly similar processes [28] . In the best cases, in which we know that S is a "true" member of the reference population (e.g. it is a physical item, mass-produced, by the same factory, to the same design and in the same production batch) and having counted the total number of failures for many nominally identical systems, and the total number of demands over which the failures occurred, we have a point estimate for the mean pfd over the set of all the systems observed. However, it is often infeasible to decide whether the inferred average describes a homogeneous population, in which the pfd is practically identical for all individuals, or how heterogeneous the population really is, e.g. whether some components are substantially more reliable, and others substantially less reliable, than this average.
Additional uncertainties arise because, for any system in our reference set, the pfd is estimated from observed demands and failures, so that rather than a measure known with certainty we have confidence intervals with an associated level of confidence. In many cases, furthermore, system S is known to differ from the reference set in some respect, but it is not clear how this dissimilarity should affect one's estimate of S's pfd. Alternatively, with copies of a system operating in different installations, there may be statistics of usage and failures that are sufficient to infer an average pfd, but also suggest that the true pfd varies among different installations, for unknown reasons. A subjective distribution of pfd of the system in a new installation needs then to include high uncertainty about the true value, with known mean.
All the above problems are present when using data from reliability databases [15] , and even more so in situations like software reliability assessment, for which quite often reliability assessment is based on conformance to required practices, hoping that the faithful application of certain standard precautions offers a high enough confidence in a certain upper bound on the system's pfd [30, 31] . In practice, even the explicit statement of confidence is usually omitted when applying common standards that cover software safety (e.g. the popular IEC 61508 [22] ). And yet cases of systems that are found a posteriori to be seriously less reliable than expected, despite rigorous assessment, are not uncommon. Examples of complex systems that failed at the first operational use include the early Space Shuttle, the Altona rail station control systems, the Ariane V [33] . In this last case, the probability of failure per demand (mission) was 1. That is, for complex systems subject to design faults, the subjective distribution of the pfd must allow it to be possibly very high, albeit with low probability. Therefore, trying to reason, conservatively, assuming a "worst case" pfd would not work: it would predict unacceptably low reliability even for a system that is likely to be quite reliable.
In the case of a software system, S's failures are due to systematic causes only, and one can test S for as long as affordable, with demands sampled from the distribution of demands anticipated to occur in operation, without fear of wear and tear, instead of relying on its similarity with other systems (as when using reliability databases). Observing high reliability over an observation period or number of demands directly increases confidence of a low pfd for the specific system S, and the formal methods of statistical inference tell us by how much [3, 30, 34, 32] . The uncertainty after statistical inference is specified via some combination of confidence bounds and confidence levels (in the case of classical inference) or a posterior probability distribution (with Bayesian inference).
Bayesian approach: using a probability distribution of the pfd
To reason rigorously about the effects of these uncertainties, the standard approach is Bayesian. This involves considering the value of the pfd of system S as a random variable Q, with its probability density function f Q (q). If S is sampled from a supply of nominally equivalent systems which actually have a range of different pfd values (due for instance to manufacturing tolerances), this subjective distribution for the specific S represents the statistical distribution of the parameter in the concrete population.
Given f Q (x), one can then derive the effects of this distribution on any prediction of interest, e.g. what is a 99% "Bayesian confidence bound" on the true pfd, i.e. that value q 99 such that we have 99% probability of S being at least as good as q 99 q99 0 f Q (x) dx = 0.99, and, more importantly, predictions about how many failures one should expect in any given period of operation, for instance the probability of surviving t future demands without failures:
It is clear that these measures depend on the distribution f Q (q). Yet, reliability calculations are often performed using a single point estimator instead of this distribution f Q , in part to avoid complex computations, and in part because the distribution is difficult to specify. The Bayesian method gives us formulas for updating f Q with the results of observation, but not for obtaining it in the first place.
Very often, what is used is an expected value of the pfd. Recognising that this may lead to errors in prediction, an attempt is often made to be conservative, i.e., to use a pessimistic estimate of this expected value. Yet, it is still necessary to ask whether the degree of pessimism introduced in the estimate of the expected pfd is enough to compensate for the possible errors introduced by performing calculations on the basis of an expected pfd. So, we have to examine these possible errors.
Errors in reliability prediction -probability of surviving t demands
Comparing two systems' probabilities of survival on the basis of their expected (mean) pfd s may be misleading. E.g., Figure 1 refers to two hypothetical systems, S 1 and S 2 , whose pfd s have Beta probability distributions with means 0.1 and 0.05 , respectively. By focusing on the mean pfd, a decision maker could easily conclude that S 2 is the system to choose. But Figure 2 shows that actually S 1 , despite having the higher (worse) average pfd, is better than S 2 for scenarios in which they are required to survive for more than 32 demands.
The next graph, in Figure 3 , also shows the predictions that would be obtained by substituting the mean pfd for the full distribution. We see that if we approximate the two pfd distributions with their means, S 1 's reliability indeed appears to be permanently worse than S 2 's; but S 1 's real reliability is much greater than that calculated using S 1 's mean pfd, and in particular it is better than S 2 's for t > 32. Using the mean pfd for comparison is indeed completely misleading.
Since a given mean pfd allows for a set of different reliability functions (probabilities of survival without failure) 3 , using the mean pfd for predicting the reliability of one system may be as misleading as using it for comparisons between systems. Rather than giving further examples, we will demonstrate this by finding bounds on the possible reliability functions and thus on errors.
3 Bounds on the reliability function, given the mean pfd Given that the pfd of a system is a random variable Q with an unknown probability density function f Q (x), but with known mean E(q) = q * , the following properties hold regarding its probability of survival over t demands (their proofs are given in Appendix A): Figure 1 : Distributions (probability density functions) of the probability of failure per demand for two hypothetical systems S 1 and S 2 . Both are Beta distributions (probability density function
). S 1 has mean pfd µ 1 = 0.1, given by parameters of the Beta distribution a 1 = 1.1, b 1 = 9.9; S 2 has lower mean pfd, µ 2 = 0.05, but with parameters a 2 = 20; b 2 = 380, giving the narrower distribution shown. THEOREM 1. The lowest probability of survival (i.e., reliability), over all distributions of Q such that E(Q) = q * , is equal to that obtained by assuming the system pfd to be equal to the mean of its distribution, q * Pr(survival for at least t demands)
The highest probability of survival (i.e., reliability), over all distributions of Q such that E(Q) = q * , is equal to that obtained by assuming that the distribution of the system pfd, Q, is
• Q = 1 with probability q * and
• Q = 0 with probability (1 − q * )
Pr(survival for at least t demands)
Note that these theorems state not only that the probability of survival for t demands, under the condition E(Q) = q * , is bounded by (1 − q * ) t and (1 − q * ), but that these two values are actually possible. This is so, because both the extreme distributions assumed in calculating the two bounds are actually legitimate probability distributions that satisfy the condition E(Q) = q * . The assumptions for the two theorems correspond to the two discrete probability assignments shown in Figure 4 .
So, we have the bounds:
while the common linear approximation 1 − tq * is a less tight lower bound on reliability. A complete proof is in Appendix A. Theorem 1 is based on Jensen's inequality [23, 9] and the fact that the geometric reliability function (1 − q) t is convex with respect to q (strictly convex for t > 1). An intuitive description of what these theorems state is as follows: any distribution of the pfd (for instance in terms of frequencies of occurrence in a population) implies a combination of individual items having greater pfd than the average, and thus higher probabilities of failing during the intended t-demand operational life, and others having lower pfd and accordingly lower probability of failing over the same life duration. The "best" one of all these distributions has the highest frequency of items with 0 likelihood of ever failing. Given the known expected pfd, this distribution must also include a few items that would fail at every demand. But in a critical application and considering potentially catastrophic failures, what matters is whether a system fails even only once in t demands. Whether a system would tend to fail once only or multiple times is immaterial, since the first failure will terminate the life of the item. We are thus interested in the system's reliability function. In the case of a design fault, e.g. in software, a dangerous failure will require a design change, applied to all copies, determining a new distribution of pfd and requiring a new acceptance decision.
Practical Implications of the Bounds on Reliability: conservatism
Theorem 1 states that using the mean pfd as if it were the true value guarantees pessimistic reliability predictions. In safety assessment, when the pfd is the probability of a dangerous failure, this will often be good news: if approximation is inevitable, erring on the side of pessimism is more acceptable than erring on the side of optimism. Therefore, using the mean pfd is a "safe" approximation: the common recommendation to base acceptance decisions on comparing the mean with an acceptability threshold can be argued to be justified as conservative.
The bad news from Theorem 2 is that this error may be quite large. Indeed, for large values of t, the worst case reliability will be close to 0 while the best case reliability will be close to 1 − q * . That is, if the real distribution is quite broad, the error may exaggerate risk by many orders of magnitude.
So, this approximation may cause us to discard systems that are indeed quite safe. Furthermore, it may cause us to rank the safety of different systems wrongly. As a striking example, a system with mean pfd 10 −4 , with a very narrow distribution, will survive 1000 demands with probability (1 − 10 −4 ) 1000 = 0.905; while another system that "is 100 time worse on average", with The same two reliability functions as in the previous figure, plus the reliability functions for hypothetical systems with pfd equal to the mean pfd s of S 1 and S 2 systems. The latter curves are shown as continuous lines for readability, although they are only defined for integer values of t. The curves labelled S 2 and S 2mean are closer together than those labelled S 1 and S 1mean , which is intuitively explained by the fact that the probability distribution of S 2 's pfd is more narrowly concentrated around its mean than the probability distribution of S 1 's pfd. Also, the S 2mean curve lies completely below the S 2 curve, and the S 1mean curve lies completely below the S 1 curve. Theorem 1 shows that this inequality holds in general.
−2 with a very broad distribution approximating the "best case" of theorem 2 will survive the same 1000 demands with much higher probability, close to 0.99, i.e., its probability of failing over the 1000 demands is almost 10 times smaller.
In the next section we study the extent of these possible errors.
Errors from using the mean pfd for ranking alternatives
Are there any conditions in which only knowing the ordering between the mean pfd s of two systems also tells us the ordering between their reliability? Suppose we know that q * 1 > q * 2 . Is then S 2 more reliable than S 1 : R 1 (t) < R 2 (t)? We observe that:
• this is certainly true for the first demand, t = 1;
• but even as early as the very next demand (t = 2), this ordering may be inverted and we could find R 1 (t) > R 2 (t)). To exclude this possibility, we would need to know that (1 − q * 2 ) 2 , the worst possible R 2 (2), is greater than 1 − q * 1 , the best possible R 1 (2) . Solving this inequality yields q *
for "smaller mean pfd " to imply "better reliability at least until the second demand", the larger mean pfd needs to be at least twice as great as the smaller;
• what precedes applies for low t. In the long run, for larger t, the mean pfd becomes less relevant than the probability of pfd values "low enough" for likely survival for t demands. As t → ∞, the reliability functions of S 1 and S 2 asymptotically tend (from above) to P r(pfd 1 =0) and P r(pfd 2 =0), whatever the other characteristics of the two pfd distributions (about the plausibility, or not, of non-zero P r(pfd = 0), cf subsection 7.4.3). So, given q Worst case distribution (Theorem 1) Best case distribution (Theorem 2) Figure 4 : The two extreme distributions discussed. The graphs represent the discrete probability masses associated with values of the pfd. They can be interpreted as representing probability density functions, with the thick vertical segments indicating Dirac's delta functions.
the two mean pfd s), a necessary condition for a "reversal of roles" (that is, lim t→∞ R 2 (t) < lim t→∞ R 1 (t): S 1 becoming eventually more reliable than S 2 ) is P r(pfd 2 =0) < 1 − q * 1 , because we necessarily have 1 − q * 1 = E(1−pfd 1 ) ≥ P r(1−pfd 1 = 1) (simply because 1−pfd 1 cannot be negative). Note that the two reliability functions will then cross at least once, as in Figure 2 , since the reliability for t = 1 is exactly 1 − E(q), and thus higher for S 2 .
• to generalize for large but finite t, the smaller pf d only guarantees the higher reliability as long as, roughly, t < q * 1 /q * 2 , the ratio between the greater and the smaller mean pfd. We show this by comparing the lifetime failure probabilities, via the ratio (1 − R 2 (t))/(1 − R 1 (t)). By assumption this is less than 1 at t = 1 (the smaller pfd implies the lower probability of failure); when for some t it exceeds 1, it indicates that the system with the "worse" mean pfd is the more reliable over that number t of demands. If, although q * 1 > q * 2 , pfd 1 has the best case distribution from theorem 2, and pfd 2 the worst case distribution from theorem 1, this ratio is
which, while less than 1 at t = 1, will exceed 1 (will show a "reversal of roles") for sufficiently large t, and keep increasing with increasing t. In fact, we can Taylor-expand the numerator here, to first and second order in q 2 , which two approximations are known to be upper and lower bounds. This yields bounds
As t increases, and while tq * 2 remains small, tq * 2 /q * 1 is a good approximation to the size of this most extreme case ratio of failure probabilities (over t demands) of the two systems, which increases linearly with t: the "reversal of roles" will occur when t exceeds approximately q * 1 /q * 2 . Further, in general, irrespective of the size of tq * 2 , there exist pairs of pfd distributions that increase this ratio to at least the size of the left hand bound in (4).
Corollaries and extensions

Reliability in continuous time
If we consider a system with exponential reliability e −λt conditional on a failure rate λ, and the latter is seen as a r.v. Λ with probability density function f Λ (x) and mean λ * , the lowest reliability compatible with these assumptions is still obtained by assuming that λ is deterministically equal to λ * :
The proof is practically identical to that of Theorem 1 (see Appendix). Indeed, this pessimistic bound applies for any reliability function (in discrete or continuous time) that is convex with respect to a single parameter q.
As for upper bounds on the reliability function, the tightest upper bound under the constraint E(Λ)=λ is 1, which is not useful (see Appendix, theorem 6 for a proof).
In the rest of this paper, we will keep referring to the case of an on-demand system, with its pfd and its probability of failure over t future demands; but our considerations will generally apply to the continuous-time case as well.
Inference from failure-free operation or acceptance testing
In the case that the system S is subjected to a certain number d of statistically representative, independently selected demands and exhibits no failures (the case of greatest interest for critical systems), the posterior distribution for S's pfd is:
and Pr(survival for at least t further demands | survival on d test demands)
A prior distribution that is "more pessimistic" than another may not necessarily lead to a more pessimistic posterior distribution after observing no failures. However, this does occur with the two "extreme" distributions in Theorems 2 and 1:
1. with the "most optimistic" prior distribution of theorem 2, one test without failure is sufficient to infer that S's pfd is 0 with probability 1, so that the reliability function is identically 1;
2. the "most pessimistic" prior from theorem 1, in which S's pfd is q * with probability 1, will not change no matter what behaviour is observed in testing. Any other prior with the same mean pfd, on the other hand, would change as a consequence of observing 0 failures, and would change in such a way as to reduce its mean pfd to some new value q ′ < q * . Therefore, it would lead to a reliability function no lower than (1−q ′ ) t , in its turn greater than (1−q * ) t .
These two bounds on the reliability after successful testing are somewhat uninteresting, since the upper bound is trivially 1 and the lower bound is obtained by ignoring any number of successful tests. Still, it is useful to observe that these are the only constraints on the posterior reliability that follow from stating a certain prior mean pfd. Using the mean alone to characterise a prior distribution is conservative, which may be appealing, but also makes it impossible for positive evidence to improve reliability predictions (while certainly avoiding errors in the direction of optimism).
We discuss in Section 5.3 more general cases of "broader" priors leading to better posterior reliability.
Effects of acceptance testing on improving systems
If there is a possibility of testing a system further after choosing it and before actual operation, the "best" and "worst" distributions of section 3 retain their respective roles. We have seen above the effects of inference about the pfd if there are no failures. As for the case in which failures do occur, this must be treated differently depending on what S is. We consider two possibilities: S is an off-the-shelf, replaceable physical item; or it is a design, e.g. software, subject to design-caused failures only. In the former case, if S fails on test, it will often be discarded and replaced with a nominally identical item, i.e., one from the same distribution of pfd values. In the latter case, S will be fixed to eliminate the "bug" that caused the failure.
Physical items When an item is chosen at random from a stock for use, and tested prior to deployment, failures are most likely, as we have seen, with the "worst-case" distribution in which the system S has pfd equal to q * with probability 1. Then, if a failure does occur, and S is a physical item, it will be substituted with another, nominally identical item: no improvement follows the failure. 4 Given the best-case distribution, instead, the substitute item will still have 0 pfd with probability 1 − q * , will be tested, and rejected if its pfd is not 0. Eventually, a "perfect", 0-pfd S will be accepted into service, although testing and discarding imperfect ones may take some time (geometrically distributed). Even excluding the possibility of the extreme value pfd = 0, a broad pfd distribution will give the advantage, over a narrower, "more predictable" distribution, that acceptance testing will make the distribution of the pfd of S items actually accepted into service better than that of S items as produced. In other words, a broad distribution means that the population of S items includes with non-negligible frequency both items that are "substantially better" and items that are "substantially worse" than average. Acceptance tests will tend to select (statistically) the better items. The broader the distribution, the farther apart the worst and best items will be, and the easier it will be for acceptance testing to weed out the worse items, so that the items that pass the acceptance tests will be better -on average.
In detail, the pfd distribution for an S item that eventually passes acceptance testing can be obtained by considering that each new item is selected independently of any other item that may have failed acceptance tests. Since we already know the distribution for the pfd variation from which we have selected, the fact that other independently selected items failed the acceptance test gives us no information about the next item selected. In contrast the fact that the latter passed the acceptance test does give us some information: this pfd distribution after passing d demands in acceptance testing will be the posterior distribution indicated before in section 4.2:
The best-case and worst-case prior distributions are, thus, again, those identified in theorems 1 and 2.
Software or design items If S is a design or software, the consequence of an acceptance test failure is repair, and thus a new pfd distribution that depends on our assumptions about the design fixing process. The usual assumption is that repair is more likely to improve the design than to make it worse (otherwise we would not attempt the repair). Then, the kind of reliability growth to be expected would depend not only on the pfd of S, but on how many faults contribute to it, and the amounts of their individual contribution. A discussion under simplifying assumptions is in [5] .
Resumption of operation after failure: predicting the number of failures
The results of section 3 apply to the scenario of primary interest to us: one in which the first failure in operation is catastrophic (or very expensive) so that it will end the operational life of the item that failed. By way of comparison, we consider briefly a scenario in which we are interested in the number k of failures (as a mean, or as a distribution) over a certain number t of demands. The distribution of this number, conditional on the value of the pfd, is binomial:
The mean number of failures, conditional on the pfd, is (according to a standard result about the binomial distribution):
Substituting the mean q * in the expression for Pr(k failures) does not offer a general upper or lower bound for this probability. We cannot generalise our Jensen-based bounding argument to bound probability of observing k failures during t demands, because the above binomial probability of k failures conditional on q is not, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1, either a convex or a concave function of q throughout the whole interval q ∈ [0, 1]. The same is true of the cumulative binomial distribution Pr(≤k failures | pfd = q).
5 When does a "broader" distribution of the pfd imply higher reliability?
Theorem 1 (p 7) shows that the most concentrated possible distribution of pfd compatible with a given mean -the distribution in which the pfd equals the mean itself with probability 1 -provides a global lower (i.e., pessimistic) bound on long term (lifetime, mission) survival probability. This suggests that in some way a "broader" probability distribution of pfd, for a given average, implies better survival probability. Is this true in some precise, general sense?
An issue is that there is no general meaning of "broader". Which one among two distributions is "broader" is often in the eye of the beholder. Variance is often used as a measure of "broadness" of a distribution; but lower variance does not guarantee lower reliability (except in the extreme case of zero variance): we can produce two distributions with the same mean and variance, and yet leading to different reliability functions.
We now show that there is a specific meaning of "a distribution being broader than another one" that implies greater reliability. Changing the probability density function for a pfd by moving probability masses towards the extremes of the range of the random variable, while keeping the mean pfd constant (Figure 5 ), creates a new probability density function that: (i) is "broader" in the common sense of the word, and (ii) also implies higher reliability, for any t > 1.
This result appears mathematically interesting; its practical use is to confirm that apparent differences in "broadness", in the intuitive sense, are useful cues for situations in which reasoning on the basis of the mean may be misleading. Whether the situation is indeed so can be verified by just computing the reliability functions using the complete distributions of the pfd. This "moving probability masses apart" operation is illustrated below, while the complete proofs are provided in Appendix B.
5.1 An operation that "moves probability mass apart" and increases system reliability, while preserving E(pf d)
For notational concision, we work in this section with the variable U = 1 − Q rather than with Q, the pfd itself; and call p the probability density for U . Figure 5 represents one possible such probability density function, p, and another, p 1 , obtained from p by the "broadening" operation. The two probability density functions p and p 1 only differ over some subsets of the abscissae (u) axis. Where they differ, the original density p is shown with a grey line and p 1 with a darker line. We define the operation of "broadening" this distribution p, in intuitive terms, as taking two separate "chunks" of probability and moving them apart from one another (without changing their 'shapes' 5 ) by displacements inversely proportional to their associated probability masses (so the lighter mass is moved proportionately farther). p p 1 Figure 5 : "Moving mass apart" illustrated as an operation in terms of density functions. The "chunks of probability mass" being moved are a rectangular chunk at abscissae u ∈ I, which is moved to the left, and a triangular chunk at abscissae u ∈ J, which is moved to the right. The area of the former is k times the area of the latter, and thus the latter has to be moved by a distance that is k times greater, for the mean value of U to remain unchanged.
The movement of probability mass producing p 1 from p "broadens the prior distribution" of U whilst maintaining the mean.
A formal, more detailed description is in Appendix B, where the following theorem is proved: THEOREM 3. If a distribution p of the probability of success U is "broadened" according to the procedure illustrated in Figure 5 that leaves the mean pfd unchanged, then the resulting reliability over a lifetime (or mission) of length t > 1 demands, always increases. A polynomial form of a lower bound on the size of this reliability increase may be obtained, and is shown as equation (22) on p 33.
Although this discussion is in terms of continuous probability density functions, the theorem is also valid if the probability distribution includes (or is wholly made of) discrete probability masses (Dirac's deltas).
Ordering among distributions
We observe that applying the "broadening" operation repeatedly, starting with the degenerate distribution in which pf d = q * with certainty, defines an ordered family of distributions with monotonically increasing values of reliability (for any given future time).
Furthermore, starting from any distribution p that is not the "best case" distribution of Theorem 2 , there are multiple degrees of freedom in choosing how to "broaden" it; although the needs to move within the interval 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and to preserve inverse proportionality between the areas and the distances by which they are shifted constrain the set of "broadened" distributions that can be obtained. Thus, there is an infinite set of such ordered families of distributions. If two distribution are in the same family, that is one can be obtained from the other by repeated application of the "broadening" operation, then Theorem 3 tells us that the broader distribution implies higher reliability.
Given the continuity of the reliability functions we consider, one can also see that "broadening" can under very general conditions "compensate" for a higher expected pfd so that, between two distributions with different mean pfd, the one with higher (worse) mean yields, for sufficiently large t, better reliability than the one with the lower (better) mean, as in Figure 2 . This reinforces the message of section 3.1 about how little mean pfd s imply about reliability.
Posterior reliability after observing failure-free operation
We observed in Section 4.2 that the two extreme priors with the same mean, producing the lowest and the highest reliability functions, also lead to the lowest and the highest posterior reliability functions after observing failure-free operation. One can easily construct many examples in which the same ordering applies to the posterior reliability between a "broader" and a "narrower" distributions produced as in the section 5.1: it is often the case that inference based on the "broader" prior distribution produces a posterior distribution that implies better reliability than that obtained by performing the same reasoning, given the same amount of failure-free operation, on a "narrower" prior distribution with the same mean. Therefore, given the continuity of all the functions considered, it is also possible to find examples in which a prior that has worse pfd than, but is broader than, another prior, leads to better posterior reliability.
That "broadening" the prior distribution of the pfd improves posterior reliability given failurefree operation is not a general truth: one can build counterexamples. The important conclusion is that since such an effect is possible, and calculating posterior reliability is easy, one should not assume a priori that the ordering between the prior mean pfd s of different systems implies the same ordering for posterior reliability, but calculate them for each individual case.
Generalisations and limits: multiple components or parameters
The above results apply to systems for which a single, "black-box" reliability parameter is sufficient description of the failure process and of the uncertainties about it. How useful are they when the system under consideration is described by multiple reliability parameters, e.g. a multicomponent system in which each component adds one or more parameters to a model of the system's reliability? For brevity, we only discuss generalisability for the pessimistic bound on reliability of theorem 1 (and section 4.1): if we take the expected values of all the reliability parameters, do we always obtain a pessimistic bound for system reliability?
The answer turns out to be "No". The bound applies in various restricted scenarios (we give examples in the next subsection), but not in general as in the case of a single parameter, and in 6.2 we show that the exceptions include very basic system configurations.
Sufficient conditions for the pessimistic bound to apply
As a premise, it is useful to note that this pessimistic bound on reliability is applicable because the reliability function of interest is a convex function of the parameter throughout the latter's range of possible values (appendix A). The concept of "convex function" extends to functions of multiple parameters [12, Ch. 3] , [9, Ch. 3] , and we will use some of the implications of this generalised convexity property.
We consider a system with multiple components, each contributing a parameter q i to the expression of the system reliability, R sys (t; q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ), and give examples of sufficient conditions under which the bound does apply, that is, using the expected values of the uncertain parameters as if they were the true values yields a pessimistic bound on system reliability. Cases in which the bound applies include:
if (i) uncertainty only affects one parameter (one component), (ii) the reliability of that
component is a convex function of that parameter (as in our example of a geometric reliability function, determined by the pfd ), and (iii) the reliability of the system is a monotonically non-decreasing function of the reliability of that component. For instance, this covers the case of uncertainty about a single component of a non-repairable series, or parallel, or k-outof-n system, made of independently failing components. The bound applies simply because monotonicity implies that the lowest possible value of the argument gives the lowest possible value of the function; 2. if (i) uncertainty affects multiple parameters, but (ii) independently (i.e. the parameter values are independent random variables; i.e., the joint uncertainty about them all is without 'epistemic correlation'), and (iii) the true system reliability is a product of convex functions, each of one only of these unknown parameters. For example, the reliability of a multi-component, non-repairable series system in which all components fail independently factorizes as R sys (t; q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) = n i=1 (1 − q i ) t , in terms of the n unknown component pfd s q i . The pessimistic bound applies here because independence implies that we can obtain R sys (t), the mean (expected value) of this product, as the product of the means of its n factors. To each of these our previous argument applies; the most pessimistic distribution of each parameter q i is the one concentrated at its mean E(q i ). Each factor in the R sys product is thus minimised, and so is, therefore, the product R sys itself.
3. if (i) uncertainty affects one or more parameters, and (ii) system reliability is a convex function R sys (t; q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) of these parameters, then again the bound applies. The bound applies as a multivariate case of Jensen's inequality, by direct analogy with theorem 1. As a particular instance of this case we can conclude also. . .
if (i)
uncertainty affects one or more parameters, (ii) system reliability is R sys (t) = (1−q sys ) t (or any other convex, non-decreasing function of the system pfd, q sys ), (iii) the system pfd is a function of those parameters affected by uncertainty, say q sys = S(q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ), and (iv) this latter function (S(q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n )) is concave, then again the bound applies: using the expected values of all parameters yields a pessimistic bound on reliability. The bound applies as an instance of case 3 above, because any nondecreasing convex function of a scalar value, that is itself a convex function -here (1 − S(q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n )) -of other variables, is itself a convex function of the latter, which is the condition for case 3 to apply.
General notes (i) all the sufficient conditions listed need to be true just for those values of t for which one wishes to estimate a bound on reliability -although in many scenarios, including those of theorem 1 and equations 5, they hold for any t > 0; (ii) similar sufficient conditions for the pessimistic bound to apply exist for the case of continuous-time reliability: they can be stated by substituting "failure rate" for pfd in the statements above. For concision we omit the detail, which uses closely similar reasoning. The differences between these cases are subtle, but highlight possible surprises when attempting to generalize the pessimistic bound. It might seem natural that if a system's pfd is a monotonic non-decreasing function of the pfd s of the components -the very common situation of an architecture in which "improving any component will improve the system" -then the pessimistic bound would naturally extend. But case 3 above indicates that the sufficient condition for our bound to hold is convexity of the system pfd as a function of the vector of component pfd s, rather than monotonicity as a function of each component pfd. If the sufficient conditions above seem inconveniently restrictive, one has to consider that the result they guarantee is very strong: it is a pessimistic bound that holds given any joint probability distribution of the parameters, including for instance cases for which intuition is of little help, e.g. when some parameters are highly correlated, and/or some parameters are negatively correlated. In case 2 a special joint distributionepistemic independence -plays a role. Epistemic independence (learning about the true pfd of a component does not affect one's beliefs about the others) is reasonable to assume in some cases, e.g. physical components randomly sampled from the output of a production line with known distribution of component pfd, but not in many others.
Below we examine some examples to underscore that these results cannot be assumed to remain true under even slightly different assumptions.
Examples where the pessimistic bound does not apply: series and parallel systems with independent failures
It is tempting to assume that the sufficient conditions for the pessimistic bound to hold extend easily to similar cases, e.g. that the statement of case 1 about series, parallel, etc systems with uncertainty about only one parameter extends to multiple parameters, possibly using the sufficient condition of case 3 above. But we do not in general find the functions that give system reliability for these simple redundant configurations, in terms of component reliability parameters, to be convex or concave over the intervals of interest. That is, given the architecture of the system but not the detailed joint probability distribution of the parameters, the pessimistic bound may or may not apply. For any reader who may be interested, the remainder of this section exhibits two simple multi-parameter cases, allowing general forms of epistemic correlation of the parameter uncertainties, which can cause the pessimistic bound not to apply.
Series system with independently failing components
We return to Case 2 above of series system with independently failing components, but remove the condition of epistemic independence. To simplify the problem, we limit ourselves to a series system made up of just two components A and B that fail independently: given specific pfd values of the two components q A and q B , the system's pfd, q AB , is given by the product 1−q AB = (1−q A )(1−q B ) and its probability of survival for t demands is Pr(survival for at least t demands
and thus when averaging over the uncertainty it is:
Were the parameterised reliability function (8) convex over the unit square, then the 2-dimensional version of Jensen's inequality would be applicable. However, we show in Appendix C that this is not the case: THEOREM 4. For no t is the function defined in equation (8) It follows that, for each t = 2, 3, . . ., there exist bivariate distributions of (Q A , Q B ) such that Pr(survival for at least t demands) exceeds (1−q * A )(1−q * B ), and, for that same t, there exist other distributions for which this inequality is reversed.
"Parallel" system with independently failing components
In the case of two components in "parallel" (and still assuming failure independence), the situation is similar, though with a slight complication. For such a system, system pfd is q AB = q A q B , which when averaged over our uncertainty gives Pr(survival for at least t demands) = 
We show in Appendix C that:
The system reliability function (1 − q A q B ) t is, for any fixed t ≥ 2, convex on a convex subset F of the unit square precisely if F is a subset of the region D on which this reliability
t has values below (1
This theorem identifies conditions for the bound to apply, but not very useful ones. Precisely, the bound
only applies if the system reliability has probability 0 of exceeding a value that depends on t but is lower than approximately 0.6. Hence, in the parallel case, it is not that the worst case bound based on expected values is never applicable; but rather that it can be applicable only for very unreliable systems, and it is thus irrelevant for most applications.
Other multi-parameter reliability functions
Other cases with two or more uncertain parameters include single-component systems whose reliability function belongs to a family with two or more parameters, e.g., Weibull. Again, we have found that using the expected values of the parameters does not yield a general lower bound on reliability.
Discussion. Implications for decision making
The immediate implications of the theorems shown are:
• the reliability function for a given system can be bounded in a very simple way, obviating the problem of not knowing the pfd distribution in detail. Especially the pessimistic bound resulting from using the mean pfd is very useful when needing to avoid errors in the direction of optimism; although these bounds will sometimes be too slack for convenience;
• when comparing systems with the same mean pfd (or failure rate), the partial ordering created by the "broadening" operation on the distribution of the reliability parameter implies better values of the reliability function.
We discuss some further implications of these facts for various decision tasks in safety and reliability engineering.
Implication of the "mean implies pessimism" result for system assessment
In many practical decision problems in reliability and safety, guaranteeing that any error is "on the side of pessimism" is considered good practice, despite it not being so in basic decision theory. Thus this simple result is useful in many cases.
Statistics from heterogeneous populations, reliability databases If the mean reliability parameter is derived from failure statistics over a population, so that the mean hides the potential for variability of this parameter across the population, theorem 1 ensures that using this mean value leads to a pessimistic prediction.
Results of conceptual modelling for design reliability There are examples of useful probabilistic modelling that yield statements about the mean value of the reliability parameter obtained. For instance, the body of work (to which we and colleagues have contributed) about the efficacy of diversity against common mode failures yields useful insight about the mean pfd that various approaches to diversity can achieve (see e.g. [29] ). Likewise the literature on the efficacy of software testing often compares expected achieved pfd [16] . The paper [6] demonstrates ways of turning limited statements about an assessor's subjective distribution for a reliability parameter into a pessimistic expected value for the parameter. In all these cases, thanks to theorem 1, results about the mean value of the reliability parameter imply results about worst-case reliability.
Expert elicitation and calibration
When depending on expert opinion as input to risk assessment, a common concern is poor calibration: the fact that experts' confidence statements about their estimates of parameters may be incorrect. The common concern is over confidence: stating narrower subjective distribution than is warranted by the expert's actual expertise (see e.g. [26] for recent results and references). Overconfidence is seen as dangerous: it may hide uncertainties that ought to be considered. So, much thought is given to how to avoid it. Theorem 3 indicates a set of situations in which overconfidence can be accepted as actually conservative, while one should be concerned about under confidence -an expert who, through modesty or because effective measures were used during elicitation to avoid overconfidence, overstated his uncertainty about a parameter -producing over-optimistic predictions.
When we can have reasonable confidence in the accuracy of the expert's opinion about the mean value of the parameter, but less so about its distribution, accepting overconfident statementsdistributions that are probably too narrow -can be the prudent course. As an example, one can envision a negotiation, for instance between a proponent of a safety-critical system and a regulator asked to approve operation of the system. Suppose that the parties have reached agreement about a claim about a mean system pfd. There remains to decide the degree of uncertainty about the true value. At this point, the proponent could stipulate, or the regulator require, so as not to make the whole case for the system rely on a possibly over-confident point estimate, that the claimed two-sided confidence intervals around the mean be wide. This constraint, imposed in the name of prudence, will actually cause more optimistic reliability predictions than using the mean pfd.
7.3 A decision scenario: component selection with regard to probability of physical failure
Suppose we have to select a hardware system S and we have two off-the-shelf choices, with identical nominal, empirically demonstrated pfd, i.e., that have given the same number of failures per year of operation, over very extensive operation: type S 1 , about which we have evidence that its pfd distribution is rather narrow, ensuring good predictability of behaviour, and type S 2 , which despite having exhibited the same average pfd as S 1 , is known for evidence of somewhat erratic quality, with some items exhibiting early failures and others extremely high reliability. How we should react to this information depends, of course, on our priorities. For instance:
• if we were only concerned with predicting the total number of failures over a long period of usage of a large population, with use continuing after each failure, we would be indifferent between types S 1 and S 2 : the total number of failures will be narrowly distributed around an average that is determined by the average pfd, equal for both S 1 and S 2 ;
• if the problem were one of setting up stocks of spares next to each individual installation of S, the predictability of type S 1 might be preferred;
• but in our reference scenario, in which system S is a critical system, for which an individual installation must have a very low probability of failure, since its failures are likely to be catastrophic (and will end the system's life), the erratic quality of type S 2 is an advantage, counter-intuitively, since it means a lower probability of observing a catastrophic failure over the lifetime of each installation. In other words, between type S 2 and type S 1 , type S 2 gives a higher probability than type S 1 that the individual system actually installed will be so reliable as not to fail at all over the installation's lifetime; it also gives higher probability that an individual system will be so unreliable that it would fail multiple times, if use restarted after each failure 6 , but this latter scenario has no importance since any failure would end the life of the system.
We are using here the informal terms "narrow" and "broad" for distributions of the pfd. More generally, even if S 1 and S 2 have different mean pfd s, "broader" distributions may imply advantages in terms of reliability. Section 5 defines a meaning of "broader" that guarantees this effect. When the assumptions of theorem 3 do not apply, a distribution that just looked "broader" than another one with the same mean may not imply higher reliability, or, instead, a distribution with worse (higher) mean could imply higher reliability thanks to being broader, as in the extreme example at the end of section 3. The message here is simply that when dealing with pfd distributions that exhibit very different shapes, even outside the precisely defined scenario of theorem 3, one should go beyond comparing their mean or some percentile, and calculate their actual implications for the system's reliability.
Decision scenarios: systematic failure, software
If we are dealing with the pfd due to systematic failures only, as e.g. with software or more in general with design faults, the distribution of pfd represents, for an assessor, a subjective probability distribution that is meant to summarise the epistemic uncertainty about the true pfd. In its turn, this subjective probability distribution may be seen as caused by the aleatory uncertainty that affects software development, so that development processes that are apparently identical may deliver products with different quality. For instance, if assessors know that past products, that had identical records of the development practices applied and of the results of the verification steps performed, nonetheless exhibited very different levels of reliability, their subjective distribution for the pfd of a new product with a similar record needs to be a broad one.
Implications for the management of software/system development
The "best" distribution in theorem 2 is one in which most attempts to produce the software or design required would produce a "perfect", fault-free result, but a few produced software (or a design) that is guaranteed to fail. More generally, the results in section 5 imply, perplexingly, that a less predictable development process is better than a more predictable one delivering the same average. This observation has little value for most decision-makers, e.g. project managers who need to decide how to ensure high reliability with respect to design faults, because their knowledge of the pfd to be expected from the available combinations of methods is usually vague, even in terms of mean pfd. However, it casts a new light on the general issue of risk-taking in projects of a critical nature.
For instance, we can apply this observation, speculatively, to the case of the Ariane V [27] , which was at first developed with a design fault that ensured 100% probability of accident at the first launch (pfd equal to 1, if we call a launch "a demand" and restrict "failure" to "destruction of the vehicle"). After the accident, the management of the project was widely blamed for omitting those elementary checks that would have discovered this fatal design fault. One might defend the management decisions that led to that design if it could be argued, upon further study, that any feasible alternative decision within the same budget constraints was likely to reduce the probability of that disastrous design flaw giving pf d = 1, but only at the cost of increased probabilities of other design flaws, all associated with lower values of system pfd, so that those alternative decisions would lead to the same (or worse) overall mean pfd, with a narrower distribution. This reasoning runs against common opinion and most expert advice.
If the first Ariane V flight had failed due to a failure mode that in retrospect had 10 −3 failure probability per flight, criticism of project management would have been much less sharp than it was in fact after the 100% probability of failure was revealed; we could have heard comments that after all the flight was afflicted by unusual bad luck. The mathematics just shown here indicate an alternative interpretation: the presence of a high-probability failure mode rather than lower-probability ones is not ipso facto an indication of worse project management decisions. It might instead indicate simply that the development process exhibits high variability of results, and although we may instinctively prefer a predictable process, we have no evidence that even the methods that we consider "best practice" can guarantee predictably better mean pfd, and better expected reliability, than what was achieved by the process that was actually used (which includes some risk of pfd = 1). Then, if the decision goal is to minimise the probability of accident, a development process with greater variability of resulting pfd may sometimes be a better strategy than one whose outcome is very likely to be close to the mean. Unfortunately, project managers generally lack the information to decide which such risk-taking is justified.
Implications for system acceptance criteria
We now change our viewpoint from that of someone charged with developing a system to that of a decision maker in the process of approving a safety-critical system for operation -for instance a safety regulator. We discussed earlier (7.2) the risk of interpreting broad confidence intervals on pfd as being conservative, while they actually imply optimism on reliability. We now consider instead the case in which the decision maker correctly propagates uncertainty on pfd to compute reliability predictions.
Suppose that the normal steps of analyses lead us to believe that a certain function in a system must have a pf d ≤ 10 −5 . If we follow a standard like the IEC 61508 standard for functional safety [22] , and try to take into account the inevitable uncertainty about the true value of pfd, this requirement may have different interpretations, including at least:
• the requirement is about the mean pfd : E(Q) ≤ 10 −5 ; or
• the requirement is that there is at least a certain level of confidence that the pfd does not exceed the stated bound: P r(Q > 10 −5 ) ≤ α.
With both interpretations, we can construct scenarios in which the choice is between two options (distributions of the pfd ) such that both satisfy the requirement, but the option that satisfies it by a narrower margin (that is, with the broader distribution) ensures better probability of accident-free lifetime. Yet, if an accident did happen and it was found, after the fact, to have had a high probability for that specific system, those in charge of design and acceptance (and licensing if the system is subjected to a licensing regime) would risk condemnation for allowing a highly dangerous system into operation.
Thus, all the actors in the development, acceptance and, where applicable, regulation process have incentives for preferring the narrower distributions, despite this being against the apparently reasonable criterion of minimising the expected number of accidents.
Probability of 0 pfd
The "best case" distribution in theorem 2 implies a non-zero probability 1 − q * of the system having 0 pfd. This is implausible for hardware, but for software it simply means not containing design faults: we may call such software "correct", or "perfect", or "fault-free". Still, a claim of this kind is likely to be controversial and is worth some comments.
We hasten to add that the considerations in this paper do not rely on "perfection" being feasible. Even if one stipulates that the case of pfd = 0 must have zero probability, the "best" distribution of theorem 2 can be seen as a limit for families of distributions which obey this constraint, and (1 − q * ) remains a practical upper bound for the reliability over an arbitrarily large number of future demands: consider that for any assumed number of demands t and any arbitrarily small ǫ, one can assign the probability mass (1 − q * ) to a range of q values such that 1 − (1 − q) t < ǫ. Whether the distribution thus obtained could be argued in practice to be correct is unrelated to whether pfd = 0 is possible, and so are our more general qualitative conclusions about the advantages of certain broad distributions.
Returning to claims of non-zero probability of pfd = 0 for software (or design in general), however, we believe that they deserve consideration. Many think that any claim of defect-free software is unbelievable, on the basis of experience and of the usual complexity of software. On the other hand, large parts of the software engineering community (especially those studying and practicing "formal methods") point at it as a very feasible target. 7 We think that the case of a "perfect", "fault-free" design is actually plausible, especially for very simple software as required in some critical applications, and that reasoning about its probability (for the class of faults of interest, e.g. those faults that might cause accidents) is a way forward for assurance in such applications. Such "perfection" is not easy to achieve, and no known method would give 100% probability of achieving it. So crucially, a claim about pfd = 0 should include a probability of this being the case; and this should be based on solid arguments, invoking for instance statistical evidence about the effectiveness of development and verification methods. The arguments in favour of using this concept in safety arguments include [4] :
• in current practice and according to most standards and regulations, most of the evidence used to argue that software is unlikely enough to exhibit dangerous failures is anyway more suitable to claim pfd = 0 than a low, non-zero pfd. Indeed, this evidence concerns the methods applied to avoid design faults in construction, find them in the finished product, or tolerate them at system level. These methods are not selective between faults with a higher or lower probability of manifestation in operation. Thus, such evidence can only be relevant towards a claim of very low probability of failures if it supports a claim of the software having no residual faults, and thus that very low probability being zero;
• in addition, for long operational lives, seemingly modest probability of fault freeness will give better assurance of reliability than a seemingly more extreme claim on pfd, which also poses great difficulties in building a sound argument [4, 30, 31] ;
• if instead we assume that a pfd equal to 0 is impossible, rather than difficult to achieve and demonstrate, then to demonstrate low probability of dangerous failure over a long operational life 8 we would need to test for some (often impractical) multiple of that life, or to have implausibly strong prior beliefs [30, 31, 36] .
Is predictability good or bad?
The theorems in sections 3 and 5 point to the non-intuitive fact that distributions that appear "broader", that is, "less homogeneous", implying "less predictable" products, may imply better reliability. The "worst case" distribution of theorem 1, in which the value of the reliability parameter is certain and identical to the mean, can be seen as the "most homogeneous" or "most predictable" distribution, among those with the given mean:
• if we think of sampling from a population (e.g. a population of nominally identical offthe-shelf hardware components), it means that every item picked will have the same pfd value
• as a subjective distribution, it is the one in which the subject has the most confidence in his estimate.
Confidence and predictability have intuitive positive connotations. Much of the engineering mindset is about achieving predictable results, in design, manufacturing processes, etc; in software engineering, much emphasis (and investment) has gone into initiatives that attempt to limit the variability of the results of software development processes. These theorems propose an exception to the general validity of this preference. The immediate implication is just that decision makers need to be aware of the possibility of surprises, and be prepared to propagate the uncertainty on the distribution of parameters to the measures of actual interest, like reliability. Some more considerations follow.
General decision making criteria in the presence of epistemic uncertainty
The discussion so far has assumed that the overriding concern of the decision maker is to minimise the lifetime probability of failure, a reasonable decision criterion when failure is expected to be catastrophic. The theorems we have presented are useful tools for decision making based on this criterion. However, as outlined in 7.4.2, other considerations will often come into play beside the lifetime probability of failure, even when it is ostensibly the main concern. This issue is most evident when we consider the decision to accept a system with a broad distribution of its reliability parameter (pfd or similar). Suppose that the system in question has both a mean pfd and a predicted lifetime probability of failure, 1 − R(t life ) that are acceptable according to the established criteria for that category of systems, say 1 − R(t life ) < ǫ; and that its value of 1 − R(t life ) is lower than for an alternative system, which has a narrower distribution of pfd ; but that the system we consider has "large" epistemic uncertainty, for instance, one implying a 1% probability of the true pfd being such that the probability of accident is 50 times greater than the accepted target ǫ.
In the case of regulated industries, where safety decisions are intended to apply the risk acceptability criteria of a society, this kind of perplexing scenario is not necessarily addressed by the general principles usually stated.
We speculate that the reaction to such a scenario would vary between different people and communities but a certain parameter distribution is likely to elicit very different reactions in different contexts. We expect that in many situations decision makers would be against accepting into operation the system hypothesised above for one or more reasons like:
• there may be a reluctance to allow a situation to develop in which the worst case consequence is one of discovering in hindsight that the system chosen was indeed subnstantially less safe than desired. This in turn invites further questions:
-"anticipated regret" has been identified as a common pattern in everyday decision making [37] , which may or may not lead, in a specific circumstance, to rational decisions in view of the decision maker's goals;
airplanes of one type", which when translated into failure rates leads to requiring upper bounds of the order of 10 −9 per hour or per flight [14] .
-for an item with the potential of massively catastrophic failure consequences, e.g. accidents in a nuclear or chemical plant, a reluctance to accept a system with broad uncertainty may be linked to the known observation that the risk of large accidents (e.g. ones causing many deaths) is usually considered by the public as less acceptable than that of a similar expected loss per year (e.g. number of deaths) distributed over small accidents. Some safety regulators explicitly include this aversion to large accidents among the socially mandated risk acceptability criteria that they have the responsibility to apply. However, the scenario here is different and more complex: the uncertainty does not concern the size of the possible disaster (nor its lifetime probability); it concerns the likelihood of choosing a course of action with a relatively high probability of causing that disaster, albeit "balanced" by an increased likelihood of very low probability of causing it. What is society's attitude (if any) to this dilemma between highly abstract scenarios?
-what if the consequence of failure is on a smaller scale, but with many more possible instances? For instance, we may consider a safety-critical part of an automobile, or an implantable medical device. Would high uncertainty be more acceptable in this case?
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-should the decision maker's attitude differ between situations in which parameter uncertainty is directly due to "aleatory", "physical" uncertainty, and those in which it appears more essentially "epistemic"? For instance, in the scenario of section 7.3, there is an action of drawing an item from a stock of apparently identical items, while in the case of software assessment 7.4, the uncertainty seems more purely subjective.
• broad distributions may indicate substantial uncertainty even about the distribution itself. A concrete example is the choice between a system with a conventional, tried and tested design and an innovative one offering "in theory" increased reliability. Here, the narrow distribution for the conventional system may well be derived, via formal statistical inference, from extensive statistics in representative situations of use; the broader distribution may well represent just the fact that no assessors believe they can confidently exclude "surprises" from the innovative system, but the details of the distribution are not supported by convincing arguments. This kind of uncertainty may be important, but difficult to represent formally: how to treat it correctly is an open problem;
• last but not least, given a broad distribution, means are sometimes available for substantially narrowing it (thus reducing "anticipated regret") while improving predicted reliability, at acceptable cost. For instance, operationally realistic testing is sometimes inexpensive, and will either produce failures or a rapid improvement in the subjective distribution of the reliability parameter, and thus the predicted reliability. However, such techniques are not available for all kinds of system.
Decision making heuristics
Until now, we have been concerned with what is the correct decision in a certain scenario; we now switch to considering whether people in those scenarios would be likely to decide correctly, if they did not apply formal probabilistic reasoning.
In informal discussions we found that several people (lay people, reliability experts and psychologists) found the results of sections 3 and 5 surprising, and their implications for decisions, in some scenarios, intuitively "wrong". 9 With such mass produced, individual person-oriented items, there would be an additional reason for accepting high uncertainty: even if the product turned out to be the "unlucky draw" -to have high pfd -any failure or accident (with at most a small number of injuries or deaths) would likely lead to correcting the design factors that caused the accident, and thus to further improving the expected number of accidents over the lifetime of the item. This would be costly for the vendor, but might on average yield better public safety than a product with lower uncertainty about its pfd. This part of the scenario can be incorporated in the probabilistic model of the total number of accidents over the design's lifetime [7] . Yet the idea that customers of a certain product may receive a dangerous item "by lottery" could appear morally repugnant.
It is well known that in conditions of uncertainty people may reach different decisions depending on whether they apply formal mathematical reasoning or what we may call "intuitive" judgement -applying well developed, not fully conscious, quick decision mechanisms, called "heuristics" in the psychological literature [25, 24] . These heuristics are well suited for satisfactory decisions in many situations, but there are well documented categories of situations in which they lead to decisions that appear inconsistent, or at least decisions that systematically violate the criterion of maximising expected utility. For professional decision makers, the importance of this kind of research is in helping to discriminate between situations in which "instinct" will produce the right decision and situations in which a formalised decision process is necessary. Research shows that although in some areas some experts develop abilities to perform intuitively complex probabilistic decision tasks with great accuracy, other categories of experts commit serious mistakes when not applying formal probabilistic reasoning, and fail to recognise situations in which they need to apply it.
We ran experiments in which lay people were presented with decision problems mimicking the choice between two systems described in section 2. For instance, they would be asked to choose between playing different games of chance, or taking different medicines with different risk of side effects. The common factors were a Bernoulli trial scenario, and the need to choose between alternate distributions of the failure probability per trial. We found that participants reacted correctly to information about the mean probability of failure per trial (analogous to our mean pfd ), that is, they preferred options in which it was lower; but reacted incorrectly to the spread in this distribution, often choosing narrower distributions although these led to lower probabilities of winning [2] .
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In conclusion, decision makers need to consider scenarios involving broad probability distribution as ones that require explicit propagation of uncertainty rather than summary, "intuitive" judgement, especially in view of the pervasive preference for predictability in engineering culture.
Conclusions
We have proved useful results for the many situations in which there is reasonable confidence about the expected value of a reliability parameter (probability of failure per demand or failure rate), but not about its distribution:
• from the viewpoint of predicting probability of failure-free operation over multiple demands, i.e. predicting a system's reliability function, using the mean of the parameter instead of its full distribution is guaranteed to err on the side of pessimism;
• there is also a bound on the side of optimism: for on-demand systems, assuming that the system has a probability q * of having pfd equal to 1, and probability 1 − q * of having pfd equal to 0;
• having these two bounds one can both perform pessimistic calculations and have an idea of how large an error the approximation may imply;
• the two distributions of pfd values that produce these pessimistic and optimistic bounds also guarantee pessimism, and optimism respectively, in the results of inference from observing some failure-free operation or testing. This invariance does not hold for most other distributions. 10 Our decision scenarios are reminiscent of the well documented phenomenon known as "ambiguity aversion", which can be stated as: "When given a choice between two otherwise equivalent options -one in which the probability information is stated and another in which it is missing -most people avoid the option with missing probability information" [35] . "Ambiguity aversion" has been widely studied; researchers have linked to it many experimental results demonstrating apparent inconsistency in decision making ; as a social phenomenon, it may explain apparent excessive purchasing of insurance; as a scientific topic, there is interest in explaining it in terms of which mental processes cause it and what may have determined its evolution as a general human behaviour. The main difference between the "ambiguity aversion" scenarios and ours is that in ours the probabilities of all outcomes are known in advance (or, rather, can be calculated with moderate effort).
These results have direct use in many situations in which there is epistemic uncertainty and one is not prepared to go though sophisticated mathematical treatment of it, either because of its cost of because the complex resulting argument is not considered helpful by the decision makers, and especially in situations in which "conservative" decisions are considered adequate.
We have also identified a partial ordering between distributions of the reliability parameter that share a common mean. The usefulness of this observation is that it leads to several conclusions that may be surprising:
• contrary to the common aversion to accepting a solution with wide range of uncertainty, sometimes a broader distribution offers better reliability;
• in particular, between two distributions with different means, the one with the worse (i.e., higher) mean may yet be the better one if it is substantially wider than the other: a system with worse expected reliability in the short term, and wide uncertainty about it, then offers better long term reliability than one with a better and more predictable short-term reliability;
• making manufacturing process more predictable in terms of achieved short-term reliability of the product may damage the operational record to be expected, unless the mean of the distribution is also improved substantially;
• given a subjective distribution of pfd or failure rate that one does not fully trust, one may be tempted to "err on the side of prudence" by assuming it broader, as in our section 5. In fact, this purported pessimism produces optimistic predictions. Seeking "pessimism" in the distribution of a parameter is pursuing a mirage: what matter is whether the specific predictions of interest err on the side of pessimism;
• thus in expert elicitation, sometimes concern over the danger of experts' overconfidence should be replaced by concern over under confidence.
Our basic theorems show sufficient conditions for broader distributions to give higher reliability. But the thesis often holds even when the sufficient conditions do not hold: the correct conclusion is that since one can propagate parameter uncertainty to reliability predictions, one should do so, so that this can be taken into account in decisions.
In scenarios with broad distributions of reliability parameters, comparisons of single statistics -means or percentiles -are insufficient for choices between alternative systems. At times, a system with the worse mean value of the parameters and chosen reference percentile will give the better longer-term reliability. These scenarios also raise questions about what criteria should guide decisions about system choice or acceptance, especially when choosing better reliability conflicts with aversion towards uncertainty.
We have generally referred to scenarios in which the concern is safety, and hence reliability measures with respect to functions and failures that may cause accidents; however, as pointed out in the Introduction, the mathematical treatment applies as well when the concern is reliability, for instance to the case of physical components that are meant to last for the lifetime of the systems of which they are part.
Substituting these in Jensen's inequality proves the theorem. THEOREM 2: Assuming that the distribution of the system pfd, Q, is
• Q = 0 with probability 1 − q * (a distribution that satisfies the condition E(Q) = q * ) gives an optimistic bound on the probability of survival for at least t demands:
(1 − x) t f Q (x) dx = Pr(survival for at least t demands)
Proof. Indeed, for this distribution, Pr(surviving t demands) = Pr(Q = 0)(1 − 0) t + Pr(Q = 1)(1 − 1) t = (1 − q * ) × 1 + q * × 0 = 1 − q * Now, for t ≥ 1, and with the real distribution of q, Pr(survival for at least t demands) =
Simplified linear bounds We have the bounds:
(1 − q * ) t ≤ Pr(survival for at least t demands) ≤ (1 − q * ).
A less tight, linear lower bound is found by observing that (1−xt) ≤ (1−x) t (for t ≥ 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1). So, the set of lower and upper bounds identified can be summarised as:
1 − tq * ≤ (1 − q * ) t ≤ Pr(survival for at least t demands) ≤ 1 − q * .
Continuous Time: the upper bound on reliability is 1:
THEOREM 6. If we consider a system with exponential reliability e −λt conditional on a failure rate λ, and the latter is seen as a r.v. Λ with probability density function f Λ (x) and mean λ * , no upper bound smaller than 1 exists for the reliability function (given the constraint E(Λ) = λ * ).
Informally, the proof is by contradiction, assuming that there is such an upper bound r < 1, and then showing how to construct a probability distribution for Λ such that the reliability at time t is greater than r. Such a distribution is obtained by assigning a large probability mass so close to Λ=0 as to ensure that R(t) > r, and then ensuring E(Λ)=λ * by assigning the remaining probability mass to a large value Λ=λ 0 which occurs with low probability.
Proof. Suppose that, for a certain t, there is a number r < 1 such that for any distribution of Λ satisfying the constraint E(Λ) = λ * , the reliability function R(t) ≤ r. Assume that the pdf of Λ is as follows:
• Λ = λ 0 with probability λ * /λ 0 and
• Λ = 0 with probability (1 − λ * /λ 0 ) (which clearly satisfies E(Λ) = λ * ), then, R(t) = R(t | Λ = 0)P (Λ = 0) + R(t | Λ = λ 0 )P (Λ = λ 0 ) = 1 × (1 − λ * /λ 0 ) + e −λ0t λ * /λ 0 > 1 − λ * /λ 0 Thus if we now choose λ 0 > λ * /(1 − r), we obtain R(t) > r, which contradicts the hypothesis. Hence, for any t, there is no r < 1 that is an upper bound for the value of the reliability functions R(t), for all distributions of Λ that are consistent with the constraint E(Λ) = λ * .
Note: If one does not wish to allow the possibility of a zero failure rate, the proof can be modified to use a slightly more complex construction, involving a probability mass p m > r assigned to values of Λ lower than a value λ m such that e −λmt > r/p m .
Appendix B "Broadening" of distributions THEOREM 3: If a distribution of u with density function p is "broadened" according to the procedure described, and illustrated in Figure 5 on p 14, then the resulting reliability always increases by an amount bounded below by the positive polynomial g(b) defined in (22) on p 33.
Proof. Let I and J be two finite real sub-intervals 12 of the unit interval [0, 1] with I positioned entirely to the left of J and having "gaps" such that 0 < inf(I) ≤ sup(I) ≤ inf(J) ≤ sup(J) < 1).
Let i and j be two functions that can only differ from zero within the intervals I and J, respectively, are nowhere negative and have integrals between 0 and 1. Define k > 0 to be the ratio of their integrals so that 0 < 
Choose any positive number b ≤ min inf(I), (1 − sup(J))/k , i.e. such that the two 'shifted intervals' 13 I −b and J +kb both lie within the unit interval. In order to retain a useful probabilistic interpretation we also require that the function p 1 given by
is non-negative throughout the unit interval u ∈ [0, 1]. Note, without delving into all the details, that this will, in many cases (depending on i, j, b, etc) effectively impose far greater constraints -on the functions i, and j -than the constraints already listed. Figure 5 on p 14 illustrates this operation performed on the distribution of u, where 1 − u = q is the pfd. In the figure we have deliberately plotted a rather complicated multi-modal (but continuous) density function p to emphasize the generality 14 of this procedure; while recognising that it is perhaps somewhat implausible that the beliefs about a real life system's unknown pfd could assume such a complicated form as the one illustrated. In the figure, the black graph with the discontinuities toward the LHS represents the new density p 1 obtained after applying the procedure. The grey line shows instead the original density p, assumed here (arbitrarily for the sake of this diagram) to have been a continuous function. The two subsidiary functions i, j used to perform the change are shown here as having simple, easily recognisable shapes (square and triangular, respectively), purely for the sake of this diagram's understandability. We have assumed,
